occurrence of multiples understates -although not necessarily severely -the duplication of research effort (see e.g., Kuznets (I962)).
I.2. The Problem
In this article we will compare efficient portfolios of research projects with portfolios that would emerge under competition among rival research unitswhat we will call 'market' portfolios. Specifically, we will examine three issues: (a) whether competition encourages too rapid a rate of technological advance (Section IV, see Proposition 4); (b) whether it encourages the rivals to undertake excessively risky research projects (Section V, see Proposition 5); and (c) whether it encourages them to choose overly similar (i.e., correlated) projects (Section III, see Propositions 2 and 3). To state the motivations behind these questions in words: affirmative answers (and we shall argue below that the answers are affirmative) would imply, respectively, that the market induces, on average, the development of too many inventions, too large a spread in the distribution of the quality of these inventions, and an excessive occurrence of Merton's multiples. We are thus concerned here with parallel research, an aspect of question (2) above.
It is as well to ask first why one might expect market portfolios to be inefficient. There are in fact several reasons (see footnote 9 on p. 585 below). In this article we will devote our attention exclusively to one reason, distinctive of the economics of science and technology. It is that of the discoveries (or inventions) made by rival research units involved in parallel research only the best is worthwhile to society (see equation (3) below). For instance, among available ways of manufacturing a commodity society wants to use only the best-practice technique. To take another example, there is no value added when the same discovery is made a second, third, or fourth time.6 To put it sharply (and thus somewhat inaccurately), the winning research unit is the sole contributor to social surplus.
All this is to state the matter in an extreme form to highlight a distinctive feature of knowledge viewed as a commodity. The point here is that the same piece of knowledge can be put to use over and over again without any 'wear and tear' (Arrow, I962). To be sure, discoverers involved in 'multiples' rarely discover the same thing. There are always qualitative differences, even if ever so small; for example, in their exact timing of discovery, methods of proof in. the case of mathematical theorems, characteristics of the product when a new commodity is invented, technology of production if the discovery is a process invention, and so on. Despite such differences the fact is that parallel research involves goal-oriented research where researchers search for the same type of thing. There are thus only quality variations in the outcomes of such research, and society gains a disproportionate amount from one of the realised qualities.
The above observation concerns the manner in which society values the outcomes of parallel research. Turning next to the way in which research units are compensated in the 'market,' we find that the compensation schemes are approximately of the form: 'the winner takes all' (see equations (6a, b) below). The institution of patents obviously mimics this rather ruthless mode of compensation. But even in the absence of patents the first firm to develop a product often makes great inroads into the market and thus reaps a large share of the rents from the invention. Here too then the winner of the race earns most of the profits that are to be earned. The point thus is not that inferior inventions earn nothing, merely that they earn a disproportionately low amount; that is why they are called inferior. The winner-takes-all hypothesis is merely an idealisation.7
These remarks about market compensation for research and development effort apply to technology. However, it would appear that in the pure sciences as well such a ruthless compensation scheme operates. Priority matters greatly to scientists, and this concern is continuously fostered by the scientific community (see Merton (I973) and Boorstin (I983), Chapter 53). In science priority is the prize. It awards 'moral possession' to the scientist (Medawar (I982), p. 260) even though legal possession may not be possible, nor indeed desired by any party. The reason why in scientific races the winner(s) is awarded the entire 'purse' unlike tennis tournaments, is not hard to find: it is often impossible to discover subsequently how far behind the winner(s) the losers of the race were at the time the race was completed.8 But not always. Writing about the race for the discovery of the structure of DNA, Medawar This leads us to the reason for market failure of concern here: the noncongruence of social goals and private aspirations occasioned by the 'winnertakes-all' compensation scheme. The point is that society does not care who is successful in solving a given scientific or technological problem, it cares that the problem is solved. But for the individual scientist (or the research team) 7 There are occasions when being a late arrival (or developer) is an advantage, as was argued forcefully by Thorstein Veblen. The critical question to ask here is whether the participants in the 'race' knew in advance that being first would be disadvantageous. If they did, then the phenomenon under study would not have been a race but a war of attrition, which requires a somewhat different analysis. If they did not, then presumably unforeseen things happened; that is, the participants did not know the 'game' they were engaged in. The problem we are analyzing in this paper is neither of these.
In fact there is a deeper point to be made about those innovations for which late arrival was subsequently seen as advantageous. The key question to ask concerns the vantage point of the evaluation of relative advantages. Thus, broad gauges (Veblen's example), which were installed much later, were economically superior to narrow gauges. Veblen's argument was that the country which had earlier installed the narrow gauge suffered in competition with those which subsequently innovated and installed the broad gauge. But during the period between the two innovations the early innovator enjoyed great benefits. Before either innovation an early innovation with the narrow gauge might well have looked good even if it had been known then that the broad gauge would subsequently come to dominate. Indeed, with a high enough discount rate it would have looked good. B Bell ( 937) has an illuminating, indirect discussion of the role played by the institution of mathematical contests in the growth of science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These contests were for the most part initiated by scientific bodies, such as the French Academy. the identity of the problem-solver matters greatly: he wants to be the successful one! Thus suppose there are two research units and two possible outcomes of each unit's research: success (S) or failure (F). Writing as (S, F) the event where the first research unit succeeds and the second fails, and so on for the remaining combinations, and ignoring research and development (R&D) costs, society clearly is indifferent between (S, S), (S, F) and (F, S). But when the market awards 'all' to the winner, neither competitor will be indifferent between them.
(For example, the first competitor will prefer (S, F) to (F, S) and indeed, (S, F) to (S, S)). This non-congruence between private and social rankings of final outcomes is a source of distortion and a reason why market portfolios are likely to be inefficient.9 1.3. The Approach We will view a research project as a real-valued random variable whose realisations are (scalar) indices of the output (or outcome) of research. Except for the two-point example in Section 111.2 we will consider continuous distributions. In Section II the basic model will be presented and conditions describing, respectively, efficient and market portfolios will be derived. In Sections III, IV and V the three sorts of biases we mentioned earlier will be derived. Section VI summarises the main conclusions.
Given the structure of both social and private rewards from R & D competition, our analysis necessarily concerns the statistics of extreme values (see expressions (3) and (4a)-(4b)
). Thus, in particular, the portfolio problems we will be analysing would be nonconcave were care not taken to restrict the available class of research projects. Except for the example in Section III. 2, we will, for expositional ease, tailor the R & D cost schedules in such a way as to concavify the portfolio problems. If the reader finds our cost assumptions unduly restrictive he can ignore them, but should then interpret our analysis as local. That is, without concavity, the distortions we identify in market portfolios are local biases: useful information for policy reform, but not necessarily enlightening about the nature of the global optimum.
9 There are at least five other reasons why market portfolios would generally be inefficient: (i) the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection are acutely present in research and development; (ii) the winner of the scientific competition does not collect the social surplus; (iii) free-entry into the race for the prize might lead to the wrong number of parallel research teams because rents are dissipated (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, ig8ob); (iv) private attitudes to risk differ from 'society's attitude to risk; and (v) at least one of the participants faces a nonconcave maximisation problem. Moral hazard has been much discussed in the principal-agent literature and is particularly relevant in answering question (5) in the text. Adverse selection is the phenomenon under study in question (4) in the text. In what follows we avoid (i) by assuming that effort can be monitored and that the characteristics of the research units are common knowledge. We will avoid (ii) by assuming that the winner in the market is awarded the entire social surplus. We will block the avenue opened by (iii) by keeping the number of research units fixed when comparing market portfolios of R & D projects with socially efficient ones. We will (except for Section III.2), avoid (iv) by postulating away differences in risk attitudes. And finally, we will bypass (v) by so choosing cost functions that the maximisation problems are concave (see below). What remains as a possible source of distortion is the feature discussed in the text above; for, recall from the work of Marschak and Radner (1972 p. 153) that for market portfolios to be efficient one in general needs social and private goals to be identical and the common valuation function to be strictly concave (and differentiable everywhere). 
We are interested, moreover, in symmetric solutions to the efficient portfolio problem and in symmetric market equilibria. This means in particular that the two research teams locate on different sides of the mid-point, 1, of the space 1 of research projects, unless they both happen to choose a1 = a2 = 1-Thus we may as well restrict firm 2 to choosing a2 from the range [o, 1] and firm I to choosing a1 from the range [1, I]. In other words, the assumption that the two firms have access to the same set of research projects -i.e. all scientific knowledge is publicly known -is not necessary.
In Section III we impose the following restriction on the class of available R & D projects: we will suppose that the closer are a1 and a2 the more highly 'positively correlated' are the research strategies (conditions (ioa) and (iob) below). For vividness the reader may wish to suppose (although this interpretation is not necessary) that the projects are perfectly (and positively) correlated if a1 = a2 = 2 and are independent (or even negatively correlated) if al = i and a2 =o.
In Section IV we are concerned with the rate of technological progress. Here it is natural to interpret xi as the inverse of development time. We suppose that varying ai changes the distribution ofxi in a first-order stochastically dominating way. In Section V, by contrast, the emphasis is the degree of risk-taking inmR & D portfolios. Hence, we suppose here that ai does not affect the mean of xi but rather determines how variable the distribution is, i.e. varying ai affects the distribution according to second-order stochastic dominance.
To focus attention on those features of R & D competition due to its particular reward structure, it is simplest to ignore risk-aversion. Thus, we will assume, except in Section III. 2, that all decision-makers are risk neutral. But risk neutrality implies we are apt to obtain corner solutions to both the market and socially planned portfolio problems. Specifically, in Section III, increasing a, (decrease a2) reduces the correlation between firm i's and 2's outcomes. If the only effect of increasing a, is to reduce the correlation -i.e. if the marginal distribution of xi is independent of a, -then, in the absence of risk aversion, such a change is an unequivocal improvement both privately and socially. Thus, without a counterbalancing force, both market equilibrium and the social optimum will place firms i and 2 at a, = I and a2 = o (c.f., Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (I986)). Similarly, in Section IV, increasing a, (decreasing a2) induces a first-order stochastic improvement in firm i's (2's) distribution, and again we are in danger of finding the firms on opposite extremes of the spectrum.
To induce interior solutions -and, therefore, to permit a genuine trade off between costs and benefits -we shall assume that a firm's costs rise as its research strategy deviates from the midpoint, 1.10 Specifically, we shall suppose that the cost function C(a) is symmetric about the point 1 and strictly convex.
II.2. Efficient R & D Portfolios
If x1 and x2 are the research outputs of the two teams, the social payoff is max {xl, x2}. Because society is assumed to be risk-neutral, choice of the pair of projects a1 and a2 yields the expected net social surplus (or benefit): j'j' max{xl, x2}g(xV, x2; a1, a2) dxldx2-C(al) -C(a2) (3) An efficient portfolio is a pair of research projects, (a8, a8), which maximises (3) subject to the constraints o < a2 $<1 and 1 < a, < i.
In what follows we will assume that g(. ) and C(. ) are such that the solution is interior and defined by the first-order conditions of the maximisation. o o 10 The intuitive idea behind the assumption is that, the farther away is the project from 1 the more 'unusual' is the research strategy and thus the more costly in terms of materials and so forth. 
Market Portfolios
We will assume that g(.) and C(.) have forms that result in a symmetric equilibrium. Since correlation is then never perfect (except possibly at al = a2 = , which we will avoid as a possible outcome) the probability of a tie is nil. We suppose, as discussed in Section 1.2, that the winner takes all and that the compensation to the winner is the social payoff. Each firm is risk neutral. Thus, if al and a2 are the two chosen research projects, firm i's expected net benefit is zrxr x1g(x, x2; a1, a2) dx1dx2-C(a1), 
? X1
Firms choose their projects simultaneously and with complete information about their rival's benefit and cost functions. A Nash equilibrium, (a*, a*), therefore describes a market outcome. Assuming the equilibrium to be interior, we note that it must be a solution of the two individual first-order conditions: 
Using condition (i b) and equation (7) 
III. I. Continuous Distributions
We assume in this section that, the closer are a1 and a2, the more highly 'positively correlated' are the two corresponding research projects. One way of formalising this assumption is to suppose that as a2 moves toward a1, the increase in the probability of a pair (x1, x2) is biggest if x1 = x2 and declines monotonically as the difference between x1 and x2 grows. That is, we can write Hence, the second and third terms of the right side of (I 2) must be equal. Now, for x2 < 2X1 _-, the absolute value, ix1 -x22, is greater than that for x2 between xi and x. Hence, from (ioa), the integrand in the first term is less than that of the third term. We conclude, from (I 2) y-(xl, x2; a,, a2) dx2 dxl, which, from (I 3), is positive. But the left-hand side of this last expression is just the negative of (9 b). Hence, from Proposition i we conclude that, in equilibrium, a, and a2 are too close together, i.e. there is excessive correlation. QE.D. The intuition behind this proposition can be conveyed in terms of market externalities. As a firm moves away from its rival in the space of research projects, it bestows a positive externality. Specifically, the likelihood that the rival is successful when the firm in question is not, increases. This is socially desirable, but it is not picked up in the firm's private calculation. There is thus undue similarity of project characteristics in the market portfolio.
III.2. Two-Point Distributions
Let us drop the hypothesis in Proposition 2 that the winner captures the entire social benefit from a discovery. Let us also eliminate risk-neutrality. Without these two assumptions, the general problem does not offer any simple analysis. But two-point distributions do yield answers. For this reason we consider here the important special case when research outcome is either a success (S) or a failure (F).
Let p(ai) be the unconditional probability of success for firm i if it chooses project at (the unconditional probability of failure is thus i -p(ai)). Assume that o p P(ai) < 2 for all at, and that p(.) is strictly concave with its maximum at 1. We shall continue to impose symmetry. Thus, p(a) = p(I -a) for o < a < I For simplicity assume in this subsection that all projects cost the same (and therefore that costs can be ignored).
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As before, let o < a2 < 1 and 2 < a, < i. Then let [i -(al-a2)] be the correlation coefficient between projects a1 and a2. The table below gives the probabilities of the four outcomes: (S, S), (S, F), (F, S) and (F, ;). (1 7)
Because we are looking at an interior solution, 2 < a < I. Therefore (dp(al)/dal) < o. Thus expression (I7) is positive when evaluated at a symmetric Nash equilibrium. It follows that the left-hand side of equation (I5) is positive when evaluated at the market portfolio. We therefore deduce PROPOSITION 3. If the outcome of research is either success orfailure then market research portfolios consist of projects that are too highly correlated.
IV. FIRST-ORDER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE
In this and the following section we are interested in the characteristics of market portfolios when the projects can be ranked in terms of stochastic dominance of some order. So, suppose that, for all a, and a2, xl and x-2 are independent random variables. In this section we will also assume that an increase in a, (resp. decrease in a2) implies a first-order stochastic improvement in x, (resp. x2). Writing We had no settled prior beliefs about the manner in which the market coordinates rival research units in their choice over the degree of similarity between projects. The fact that 'multiples' are observed is no ground for thinking that the market encourages too much correlation. The correct question to ask is if there are too many multiples on average. Our tentative conclusion is that there are (Propositions 2 and 3) .
Taking all things into account, whether the market encourages undue investment in R & D is therefore a question that is unresolved by our analysis. Propositions 4 and 5 identify circumstances where it does and Proposition 2 circumstances where it does not. But the most important moral is probably the one that emerges from Proposition 2: it is that academics are not lone wolves trying as much to differentiate themselves from their rivals; they work on projects which are far too similar!
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